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Employee Choice Over Pay Mix

Imagine a company
that set the pay
level of each of its
employees and then
gave the employees
nearly complete
choice over the mix.

Suppose the company set the level
of pay and then let employees
choose the fractions they wanted
a s g u a r a nteed sa l a r y, sto ck
options and at-risk bonus. The
fraction in at-risk bonus was
capped at 20 percent of total
pay and the payout was between
0 and 2.5 times the amount put
at-risk and was a function of individual and group performance.
T his is not a theoretical
example; it’s real! And, it is interesting for a variety of
reasons, including that it is so extreme and because the
organization invited some researchers inside to study the
fascinating choices made by employees.
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The organization that employed this pay system was
a company in a technical sector with fewer than 1,000
employees. The company was young, and the average age
of employees (35) was about five years under the national
average. The company also aggressively recruited and had
very high average levels of compensation. So it is not necessarily typical, but offers interesting learning nonetheless.
The company originally had the idea for this pay plan
because the senior leaders reasoned that certain employees
may value certain forms of compensation more than others.
So, they figured, why not let the employees choose? Of
course, offering employees some choice over their compensation is not particularly new and has been discussed in
practical and academic outlets (see, for example, John E.
Tropman’s “The Compensation Solution,” 2001, Jossey-Bass).
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Cafeteria and related pay plans have enjoyed varying levels
of interest in the past decades. Such plans can be beneficial because organizations can get more for their money
if employees value differently different forms of pay. On
the other hand, some have argued against such plans for
a variety of reasons, including that they are more difficult
to administer.

Did Employees Make Different Choices?
I was incredibly enthusiastic about this organization’s
plan. They were essentially running an experiment by
externally changing the system, and letting me and one of
my colleagues do some evidence-based analysis of what
followed. Craig Olson and I have a working paper on the
topic (“Employees’ Choice of Method of Pay”). In the paper,
we document that certain kinds of workers made quite
different choices compared with their peers, and consider
some potential reasons why.
We found that there is substantial variation in the choice
of contingent pay with some workers choosing almost
all base pay and others choosing almost entirely stock
options. I can only touch on some of the highlights here,
but one interesting feature is that men and women made
substantially different choices over their method of pay. The
bottom line is that women were much less likely to choose
at-risk pay than men. For example, on average, women
chose to have 91 percent of their pay in salary, 8 percent
in stock options and only about 1 percent in at-risk bonus.
On the other hand, on average, men chose 81 percent
salary, 17 percent as stock options and about 2 percent in
at-risk bonus. The findings based on gender are consistent
with some work in psychology and behavioral economics
relative to attitudes toward risk by gender.
We also found some evidence based on other sorts of
demographic characteristics of the employees. For example,
we found some evidence that younger employees, more
experienced employees and higher-paid employees are more
likely to allocate a larger fraction of their total compensation
to at-risk alternatives.
Of course, many of these characteristics could be interrelated. For example, it turns out that during the time of
our study, men at that company were, on average, paid
more and had been at the company longer, making gender
correlated with level of pay and experience. But, controlling for several things at once, and doing some statistical
analysis, one result stands out among all others — in this
firm at the time of the study women chose less risky forms
of compensation than men.

But what does this mean? Should more companies try this
sort of thing? Will the employees be better off? Will the
firms be better off? Does this type of compensation plan
put the company at any kind of risk?

An Extreme Reversal
The organization ultimately decided to switch completely
away from the complete choice model to one in which there
are was no choice at all — everyone was compensated,
pretty much, only in cash. The company removed essentially all benefits, but left health insurance intact, then took
all of the resources saved and redistributed them to the
employees in terms of higher salaries. There were a variety
of possible reasons for this change, including that some
employees may have been earning less than the minimum
wage in cash and the fact that those who chose to be paid
heavily in options may not have been perfectly educated
on this type of pay — both potential liabilities to the organization. Another reason may have been the administrative
burden of a plan based on employee choice.
But, I believe the biggest reason for the switch to (almost)
all cash pay was the chief human resources officer’s (CHRO)
belief that employees know what they value most and
should be in the best position to decide. To this executive,
cash compensation seemed the most efficient mechanism
for letting employees have total choice. If an employee
wanted child care or a gym membership or equity assets,
he/she could buy it on his/her own. For the organization
at that time, the CHRO believed that its employees valued
certain things so differently that they would be better off
with the cash, making their own choices. The company’s
leadership team, however, decided to keep one benefit in
addition to health-care insurance because they found the
employees valued it much more than it cost the company
(a benefit that I was even able to enjoy when I visited):
free food.

got a

The Institute for Compensation Studies (ICS) at Cornell University
analyzes, teaches and communicates about monetary and nonmonetary rewards from work, and how rewards influence individuals,
companies, industries and economies. ICS research and leading-edge insight
address compensation issues challenging employers and employees in today’s
dynamic global marketplace. www.ilr.cornell.edu/ics
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